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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
HalRob, Inc. and RobHal Management, Inc. appeal from 
an order for a preliminary injunction the district court 
entered in this matter on April 15, 1997, in accordance 
with its opinion reported as Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. 
RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1997). On July 31, 
1997, we stayed the preliminary injunction pending this 
appeal. 
 
After a careful review, we have determined that there is 
no basis to disturb the preliminary injunction except in one 
respect. In particular, we conclude that the Anti-Injunction 
Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2283, did not preclude the district court 
from granting the preliminary injunction and that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in entering an 
injunction against HalRob, Inc. and RobHal Management, 
Inc. barring them from seeking damages and other relief in 
the New Jersey proceeding. 
 
We conclude, however, that the injunction sweeps too 
broadly. The court limited the scope of the injunction by 
providing that it would not prevent the 
 
       parties to the New Jersey action from seeking 
       preliminary injunctive relief only, pending a decision by 
       the above-referenced arbitrator, against Specialty 
       Bakeries, Inc., Rocco Fiorentino, Frank J. Guglielmo, 
       John E. Gerber, Jr. or Manhattan Bagel Company, Inc. 
       to prevent them or any of them from making any 
       impending material change in the status quo as it 
       existed as of February 7, 1997. An impending material 
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       change is one that would eviscerate the arbitration 
       process. 
 
Specialty Bakeries, Inc., 961 F. Supp. at 831. The district 
court used the February 7, 1997 date as HalRob filed the 
New Jersey action on that day. 
 
The district court fashioned its limitation on the 
injunction in an attempt to comply with our opinion in 
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 814 (3d 
Cir. 1989), in which we said the following with respect to a 
court granting preliminary injunctive relief pending 
arbitration: 
 
        In sum, courts invoke the phrase `preservation of the 
       status quo' as a summary explanation of the need to 
       protect the integrity of the applicable dispute resolution 
       process. Thus, the court granting an injunction has the 
       power -- and indeed is required -- to make all factual 
       findings necessary to `set forth the reason for. . . 
       issuance [of injunctive relief].' Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 
       Moreover, because the district court must focus on 
       preservation of the integrity of the arbitration process, 
       the relief granted need not be limited to restoring the 
       parties precisely to their pre-litigation position without 
       regard to the irreparable injury that movant faces. If 
       the existing `status quo' is currently causing one of the 
       parties irreparable injury and thereby threatens to 
       nullify the arbitration process, then it is necessary to 
       alter the situation to prevent the injury. 
 
On further appeal in Ortho we reiterated that if necessary 
to preserve the arbitration process, the district court may 
alter the status quo. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 
F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The difficulty with the preliminary injunction in this case 
is that it permits the New Jersey plaintiffs to seek only an 
order barring the defendants there, who are the plaintiffs 
here, from making a material change in the status quo. But 
as Amgen recognizes, the status quo in itself may "caus[e] 
one of the parties irreparable injury and thereby threaten[ ] 
to nullify the arbitration process." Ortho Pharm. Corp., 882 
F.2d at 814. In that circumstance, "it is necessary to alter 
the situation to prevent the injury." Id. Accordingly, while 
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the exception to the injunction barring the New Jersey 
plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief is acceptable as far 
as it goes, it should be broadened so that the New Jersey 
plaintiffs may seek a change in the status quo if necessary 
to prevent a nullification of the arbitration process. Thus, 
we will remand the case to the district court to modify the 
preliminary injunction in accordance with this opinion. 
 
Accordingly, in the circumstances we will affirm the order 
for the preliminary injunction entered April 15, 1997, as 
modified herein, and will remand the case to the district 
court to enter an order modifying the preliminary 
injunction in accordance with this opinion. Upon entry of 
the modified preliminary injunction, the stay we entered on 
July 31, 1997, will be deemed vacated without further 
order. The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
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